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In the instant case, while it is arguable that since the prior dealings of the parties
resulted in formal agreements, the parties here intended not to be bound unless a simi-
lar formal agreement was executed;7 it would be preferable to hold there was a bind-
ing contract, since all the details had been agreed upon, and the formal writing con-
tained no terms other than those to which the defendant had assented, and since the
statement, "This memo becomes void when sale is covered by contract," most likely
contemplated the binding effect of the memorandum, and certainly not an intention
not to be bound.
Corporations-Right To Withdraw a Registration Statement Filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission-[Federal].-A corporation, attempting to
register 35,000 shares of its common stock, filed a registration statement with the
Securities and Exchange Commission. The day after the registration statement be-
came effective, but before any of the registered stock had been sold, the commission
notified the registrant that a hearing was to be held to determine whether a stop order
should issue suspending the effectiveness of the statement. After several hearings had
disclosed that shares of the same stock, issued before the Securities Act of 1933, were
outstanding in the hands of the public, the corporation moved for leave to withdraw
its registration statement. The commission denied the application to withdraw on the
grounds that withdrawal would not be consistent with the public interest and the pro-
tection of investors. The respondents, officers of the corporation, refused to testify
further, and the commission applied to the federal district court for an order requiring
the respondents to comply with the terms of a subpoena. Held, order will issue. The
respondent cannot withdraw as of right under the circumstances of this case. Securi-
ties and Exchange Conmnission v. Hoover.'
Whether or not a registrant can withdraw his registration statement was considered
by the United States Supreme Court in Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission.
In that case the Court held that since the registration statement had not yet become
effective and since no stock had actually been issued, the commission could neither
deny registrant the right to withdraw nor compel the giving of testimony and the
producing of evidence at public hearings. In reaching its decision the Court relied
upon the general rule of law that a plaintiff can withdraw his complaint at any time
before final decree3 unless withdrawal will prejudice the defendant in some way other
than mere vexation from future litigation.4 The Court denounced further investiga-
tion as an unlawful "fishing expedition."s Although the decision in the Jones case
'7 See cases cited in notes 14 supra.
x 25 F. Supp. 484 (111. x938). See Resources Corp. Intemat'l v. S.E.C., C.C.H. Sec. Act Serv.
30,099 (App. D.C. 1939).
2 298 U.S. i (1936).
3See Ex parte Skinner and Eddy Corp., 265 U.S. 86 (1924); McGowan v. Columbia River
Packers' Ass'n, 245 U.S. 352, 358 (i917).
4 See Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Central Transportation Co., 171 U.S. 138, i45-6 (1898);
Welsbach Light Co. v. Mahler, 88 Fed. 427 (C.C. N.Y. 1898).
s For condemnation by the Court of investigations made with the hope that a violation
of the law will be discovered see Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264
U.S. 298 (1924); Ellis v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 237 U.S. 434, 445 (1915). For gen-
eral discussion see Mechem, Fishing Expeditions by Commissions, 22 Mich. L. Rev. 765 (1924).
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can be attacked as to both the applicability of the court's stilted analogy to dismissal
by a plaintiff6 and the justification for its denunciation of the commission's investiga-
tion as an unlawful "fishing expedition,"7 such attack is unnecessary to uphold the
decision in the instant case. The cases are distinguishable, for in the Jones case no
hearings had been held, the registration statement had not yet become effective, and
issues similar to the one registered were not outstanding.
No analysis of the problem of withdrawal, however, can be divorced from an inquiry
into the purpose of the Securities Act. If the statutory requirement of full and ade-
quate disclosure was designed only to protect potential purchasers of the registered
stock, the Jones case was correctly decided, and the instant case would seem to be
wrong.8 If, however, the legislature intended to aid those who purchased securities
of the type sought to be registered, whether registered or not, both cases are probably
right. The broader interpretation should be adopted. For even if none of the securi-
ties sought to be registered has been sold, if similar issues of the same stock are out-
standing, full disclosure would seem to be desirable in order to protect potential pur-
chasers of such stock. A similar view was emphasized by the commission in It the
Matter of Oklahoma Texas Trust. In that case stock covered by the registration state-
ment was issued and outstanding; permission to withdraw was nevertheless denied on
the grounds that the rights of future potential investors to adequate and accurate
information had come into being.9 Disclosure might leave depreciated securities in the
hands of present holders, but this fact does not justify permitting withdrawal. The
fraud necessitates eventual loss to someone; disclosure and resultant present loss to
a few are preferable to building an economic structure on undisclosed misrepresenta-
tions. Moreover, disclosure may aid the holder of the non-registered securities; it
6 The upholding of specific court rules to the effect that dismissal without prejudice may
be refused if the court deems such action in the interest of justice would tend to show that
dismissal is a procedural question, and not one of substantive right. For cases of this type see
Bronx Brass Foundry, Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 297 U.S. 230 (1936); Young v. Southern Pa-
cific Co., 25 F. (2d) 630 (C.C.A. 2d 1928). Since an administrative body is charged with en-
forcing the act while a court is merely a disinterested umpire, it would seem even more desir-
able for the former to exercise that power. Moreover, administrative bodies should not be
hampered by technicalities of common law procedure. 34 Mich. L. Rev. 1o3x, 1033 (1936).
See also I.C.C. v. Baird, x94 U.S. 25, 44 (1904).
7 The fishing expedition rule would seem to be inapplicable inasmuch as there was to be no
general inquiry. The notice of stop order proceedings specified in detail the items as to which
information was desired, and the district court ordered Jones to testify only upon pertinent
matters. It is clearly settled that investigation will be allowed as to specific charges. Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894). Moreover, hearings were held only
after the registrant invoked the commission's jurisdiction by filing the registration statement.
In addition, it would seem that the commission's activity would be authorized under its gen-
eral investigatory power. See 48 Stat. 85 (1933), as amended by 48 Stat. 908 (1934), is
U.S.C.A. § 77s (b) (supp. 1938).
8 If securities have been sold under an effective registration statement, withdrawal will be
denied the registrant. See In the Matter of National Boston Montana Mines Corp., i S.E.C.
639 (r936); In the Matter of Treasure Hill Extension Mines Co. Inc., 2 S.E.C. 134 (x937);
In the Matter of Sunset Gold Fields, Inc., 2 S.E.C. 329 (1937).
9 In the Matter of Oklahoma-Texas Trust, Sec. Act Rel. z563 (1937), aff'd zoo F. (2d) 888
(C.C.A. zoth 1939).
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may provide him with an action against the issuer or seller provided by section 12 of
the Securities Act.1o
Conceivably, however, the statute was designed not only to prevent the sale of
poor securities without adequate disclosure, but also to expose those who violate or
attempt to violate the act. Section 24 provides that wilfully violating the act or
rendering the registration statement misleading by either making an untrue statement
of a material fact or omitting material facts is punishable by fine or imprisonment."
Thus, even if no stock has been issued and the registration statement has not yet be-
come effective, the registrant is subject to criminal prosecution. Although this section
is by no means conclusive upon the question of withdrawal, it does tend to show that
the scope of the act comprehends more than the mere sale of securities. The entire
statute is pervaded with the idea that full and adequate disclosure is necessary to pro-
tect the investing public. It is submitted that exposure though no stock has been sold
is consistent with this protection. Such exposure is desirable to inform the investing
public as to the character of the registrant who tried to and might again attempt to sell
securities. To discourage attempts by registrants to "get by" with defective registra-
tion statements would also seem to be consistent with the protection of the investors'
interests. It is submitted, therefore, that withdrawal should be denied the registrant
even in the Jones case situation. In any event the instant case is no doubt a logical and
desirable limitation upon that doctrine.
Criminal Law-Power of Judge To Comment on the Guilt of the Accused-
[Federal].-The defendants were convicted in a federal district court for the crime of
intimidating a witness appearing before a federal commissioner. In his instructions
to the jury, the trial judge (i) directed the jury to dismiss the accuseds' version of
certain controverted facts from their minds and (2) intimated that he preferred the
testimony of a witness for the prosecution because it was probably "the first time
that he has ever been in a court, and he meticulously tried to tell the truth," while the
accused had much experience in and about courts of law. On appeal, held, reversed
and remanded. Instruction (i) was in error as withdrawing facts from the considera-
tion of the jury to the prejudice of the accused, and instruction (2) was in error as
adding to the evidence. A concurring opinion by two of the court, written by Major,
J., advocated a restriction of the power of judicial comment to the jury and concluded
that in criminal cases the Supreme Court has never sanctioned comment on the ulti-
mate issue, i.e., the guilt of the accused, except where the facts were uncontroverted.
United States v. Meltzer.'
'The concurring opinion departs from what has been the accepted rule of comment
in the federal courts. While a majority of the states have delimited or abolished the
power to comment by constitutional provision, statute, or judicial decision,2 the federal
10 48 Stat. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C.A. § 771 (2) (supp. 1938). The seller is civilly liable if he
induced the sale by fraudulent or misleading statements even if securities are not registered.
"48 Stat. 87 (I933), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77x (supp. 1938).
'IOO F. (2d) 739 (C.C.A. 7th i938).
'See Rest., Code of Criminal Procedure Ann. § 325 (1930); Otis, "Governor of the Trial"
or "Referee at the Game," 21 J. Am. Judic. Soc. io5 (1937). See also Sunderland, The Problem
of Trying Issues, 5 Texas L. Rev. i8, 32 (1926). For an explanation of the reason for the dif-
ference in rules, see Thayer, Preliminary Thesis on Evidence i8rn (1898).
